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LIMITATION OF AcTIONS - CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS - The application of statutes of limitation to proceedings for criminal or civil
contempt involves some obscurity and confusion in the modern cases.
Legislation has rarely provided expressly for the limitation of contempt proceedings, and their hybrid character has made it difficult to
rely with confidence on analogies. The modern tendency of courts has
been to di:fferentiate between criminal and civil contempts for many
purposes.1 While the tests for distinguishing civil and criminal proceedings are not yet clear, it seems that the application of limitation acts
depends very largely on this distinction.
Should the proceeding be established as one for criminal contempt,
the law has heretofore been thought fairly well settled. If there is a
limitation on contempt itself, or if contempt is made a crime by statute,
neither ;iuthority nor logic seems to deny that the proceeding would be
barred.2 In other situations, however, there is some confusion. Where
1 For some of the other results which flow from the distinction, see 3 1 M1cH.
L. REv. 1161 (1933), and cases cited.
2 There are only two jurisdictions having statutes which specifically provide for
contempt, and apparently only one case has raised the point squarely. The Clayton
Act [38 Stat. L. 740 (1914), 28 U.S. C. (1934), § 390] contains such a provision,

COMMENTS

the act is independently criminal, the usual course has been to say that
the contempt is barred with the crime; 8 if the contemptuous act is not
a distinct crime and there is no statute directly applicable, the common
residuary limitation has been held to preclude the proceedings.4 In
the last year, however, at least one court has taken a different approach
and said that criminal contempts were sui generis, and that even though
a statute might bar a prosecution for the criminal act constituting the
offense, the court could still punish for the contempt. 5
In the field of civil contempt, results are more uncertain. The
general problem is whether the statutes which are held applicable to
enforcement procedure in general will carry over to contempt proand while there has been some litigation under the section, most of it has been only
as to its inclusiveness rather than its effect. See United States v. Whiffen, (D. C. Ohio
1927) 23 F. (2d) 352, reversed by United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229, 48
S. Ct. 486 (1927). Odell v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 91
F. (2d) 359, recently decided, seems to be a square decision that the proceedings
would be barred. See also, Ariz. Rev. Code (Struckmeyer, 1928), § 4475.
In a jurisdiction where contempt is made a crime by statute, the proceeding
would be barred by the statute relating to the class of crimes in which contempt was
placed. Gordon v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 461, 133 S. W. 206 (1911). Apparently
there are no cases to the contrary, though of course it could be said that the mere
fact of making contempt a crime did not remove the court's inherent right to punish,
but only added another possible penalty.
8
Beattie v. People, 33 Ill. App. 651 (1889); Goodall v. Superior Court of
Santa Barbara County, 37 Cal. App. 723, 174 P. 924 (1918). In the latter case the
court seems to say that the adoption of the statutory period is permissive, but it does
proceed to adopt it.
4
Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 34 S. Ct. 693 (1914), reversing
In re Gompers, 40 App. D. C. 293 (1913). The statute here is a typical one. It reads:
"No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital •••
unless the indictment is found, or the information is instituted, within three years
next after such offense shall have been committed••••" Rev. Stat., § rn44, 18
U.S. C. (1934), § 582.
See also Pate v. Toler, J., 190 Ark. 465, 79 S. W. (2d) 444 (1935), construing Ark. Stat. (Crawford & Moses, 1921), § 2887 [Dig. (Pope, 1937), § 3703];
State v. Phipps, 174 Wash. 443, 24 P. (2d) 1073 (1933), construing Wash. Comp.
Stat. (Remington 1922), § 2005.
5
State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N. W. 282 (1937), discussed in 15 NEB. L. BuL. 387 (1937). In this case the limitation act in force referred only to a "felony," "misdemeanor or other indictable offense below the grade
of felony," and "any fine or forfeiture under any penal statute," none of which the
court held would encompass contempt. Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 29-1 IO. The
only suggestion of a limitation given by the Nebraska court is found in the language,
"unless there is a showing of special circumstances by which delay in instituting the
suit has prejudiced the rights of the defendant, the action is not barred by lapse of
time."
See also In re Jibb, 121 N. J. Eq. 531, 191 A. 552 (1937), a similar case, but
the act here was the filing of a false affidavit, which the court treats as a direct contempt
and thus on a somewhat different footing.
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ceedings, no provision having been made for them in terms. Modern
codes commonly allow money decrees in chancery to be enforced in
the same manner as law judgments,6 and enforcement of law judgments often may be effected by procedure traditionally belonging to
equity. 7 Merger of law and equity has sometimes gone further, and
provisions may be found which require enforcement of all judgments
of certain types by execution and allow enforcement of the remainder
by proceedings which amount to contempt. 8 This type of statute simplifies the problem in that under such provisions it is apparent the
equitable or legal nature of the adjudication on which the proceeding is brought will not control, but rather the character of the remedy
sought will be scrutinized in applying the limitation statutes. 9
The form which the limitation takes may be a controlling factor in
determining its applicability to contempt proceedings.10 A common form
is that which bars actions on judgments aftera~pecified period of time.11
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937), c. 22, § 47. The contempt power is provided for by §
42 of the same chapter. See also, Mich. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 14685.
7 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929), § I 102.
8 N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Cahill, 1937), §§ 504, 505: "a .final judgment may be
enforced by execution: 1. Where it is for a sum of money in favor of either party;
or directs the payment of a sum of money. 2. Where it is in favor of the plaintiff in
an action of ejectment or for dower. 3. In an action to recover a chattel, where it
awards a chattel to either party." It may be enforced by contempt "1. Where the
judgment is .final and cannot be enforced by execution, as prescribed in the last section.
2. Where the judgment is .final and part of it cannot be enforced by execution..••
3. Where the judgment is interlocutory and requires a party to do or refrain from
doing an act, except in a case specified in the next subdivision. 4. Where the judgment
requires the payment of money into court, or to an officer of the court...." Holding
that where an execution can issue contempt proceedings cannot be used: People ex rel.
Sarlay v. Pope, 230 App. Div. 649, 246 N. Y. S. 414 (1930). Walters v. Reinhoudt,
130 Misc. 745, 225 N. Y. S. 123 (1927).
For a statutory provision similar in effect to the New York statute above referred to, see N. C. Code (1931), § 663.
9 "Unless statute provides otherwise, a judgment for alimony is subject to the
same incidents as any other judgment in regards being barred by limitation statute."
Eubank v. Eubank, (Mo. App. 1930) 29 S. W. (2d) 212.
10 One type of "limitation" which would not be applicable here is that which
comprises the various formal requirements for preserving the right to take out execution. For instance, New York requires renewal every .five years or permission from
the court (Civ. Prac. Act, §§ 650, 652); Illinois requires a scire facias or a "civil
action" after seven years. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937), c. 77, § 6, c. IIO, § 179. In other
states nothing is required so long as the judgment exists. State ex rel. Meyer v. Buford,
(Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 526, construing Mo. Rev. Stat., (1929), §§ 1II3
and 886.
11 "Within ten years an action [must be brought] I. Upon a judgment or decree
of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory thereof, from the date
of its rendition . . . ." N. C. Code (1931), § 437. For a similar provision, see Mich.
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This is held to bar executions,12 supposedly whether they are on equity
decrees or common-law judgments.13 The primary question under this
type of statute seems to be whether contempt proceedings are "actions"
within the meaning of the legislature, or whether their origin as extraordinary proceedings will serve to keep them as something apart.14
Many jurisdictions have failed to provide a limitation on actions
on a judgment, but rather gain their objective by providing a conclusive presumption of satisfaction of the judgment itself. 15 Should
the statute "conclusively presume" that judgments or decrees had been
satisfied after the expiration of a certain term, on the face of it one
may be justified in saying that the form of the action brought would
be immaterial, and the decree would be as satisfied whether the plaintiff used contempt or some other form of enforcement.16 But this type
Comp. Stat. (1929), § 13976 (1). Also see Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937), c. 77, § 6, c. 83,
§ 26.
Limitations on actions on a judgment may arise by analogy. See Graham v.
Simon, 76 Ohio St. 77, 81 N. E. 170 (1907), and Stewart v. Campbell, 97 Ohio St.
335, 120 N. E. 175 (1918), construing Ohio Gen. Code, §§ 11648, I 1227.
As a judgment is sometimes regarded as a contract, the limitation on contracts
could conceivably bar actions on judgments even if there were no statute which
did so in terms. Holding, however, that a limitation on "actions of debt grounded upon
any lending or contract" does not limit actions on a judgment is Vincent v. Watson,
40 Pa. 306 (1861), construing a provision which is now contained in Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, 1930), tit. 12, § 31.
12
Holding that a motion for an execution is barred by the North Carolina statute
cited in note 11: McDonald v. Dickson, 85 N. C. 248 (1881); Ex parte Smith, 134
N. C. 495, 47 S. E. 16 (1904). To the same effect under the Michigan statute, see
Jerome v. Williams, 13 Mich. 521 (1865); Parsons v. Wayne County Circuit Judge,
37 Mich. 287 (1877); Ludeman v. Hirth, 96 Mich. 17, 55 N. W. 449 (1893).
u Eubank v. Eubank, (Mo. App. 1930) 29 S. W. (2d) 212; Arrington v.
Arrington, 127 N. C. 190, 37 S. E. 212 (1900), decided under the statute referred
to in note II. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 213 Mich. 660, 181 N. W. 993 (1921), was decided
under a Michigan statute limiting actions "founded on judgments or decrees." The
case was a contempt proceeding to compel payment of installments of alimony in
arrears. The court held that the action was maintainable at least for those payments
which accrued in the ten years next preceding the action, but in so doing indicated
that all other payments would be uncollectible.
14
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Cahill, 1937), § IO: "The word 'action' contained in
this article is to be construed, when it is necessary so to do, as including a special
proceeding or any proceeding therein or in an action." See note 22 for application of
this to the residuary clause.
15
E.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929), § 886: "Every judgment, order, or decree •••
after the expiration of ten years ••• or if the same has been revived •.• then after
ten years from and after such revival ••• such judgment shall be conclusively presumed
to be paid, and no execution, order, or process shall issue thereon, nor shall any suit
be brought, had or maintained thereon for any purpose whatever."
16 The Missouri provision in the previous note seems comprehensive. While a
contempt proceeding never seems to have raised the point under this statute, it was
held in Eubank v. Eubank, (Mo. App. 1930) 29 S. W. (2d) 212, to devitalize an
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of statute is not universal. Indeed there may be no legislative limitation
at all,11 and the conclusive presumption of payment may be combined
with the limitation on actions to enforce judgments 18 or it may exist
alone.19 It may also be provided that certain types of judgments shall
be presumed satisfied, and the others left unmentioned. 20
If there is neither a provision which deals with actions on judgments nor a presumed satisfaction of the particular type of judgment
in question, an enforcement of judgment in the usual way may be
prohibited by a residuary limitation found in some jurisdictions. 21
Thus in New York, where the disabling statute operates only on money
judgments, other methods of enforcement are cut off by the ten-year
residuary clause.22 Here there is only the old problem in a new dress,
the court having to decide whether to conclude the contempt proceeding
by virtue of the statute as to actions; and again about the only guides
are the cases in which other proceedings for the same end are barred. 23
A final possible restriction on the time in which contempt proceedequity decree so that it could not be enforced by an execution. There seems to be no
room for doubt that an ordinary suit would be barred. The intermediate appellate
court in Missouri has held this provision to be applicable only to money decrees, and
while the case was that of an injunction and thus could have been decided on the
ground that the decree was a continuing decree, such probably is the general view of
similar provisions. Kelly v. City of Cape Girardeau, 230 Mo. App. 137, 89 S. W.
(2d) 693 (1936). See 34 C. J. 693 (1924).
Of course, before there could be any dispute over the type of action brought, it
would have to be decided whether the judgment was enforceable for any purpose.
Courts have construed statutes of similar import to be only rules of evidence. Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), § 2-614, so construed in Odell v. Green, 72 Ind. App.
65, 121 N. E. 304, 122 N. E. 791 (1918).
17 See Barber v. International Co. of Mexico, 74 Conn. 652, 51 A. 857 (1902).
18 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), §§ 2-602, 2-614.
19 N. C. Code (1931), § 437.
20 The statutory provision in New York refers to money decrees. Actions to
enforce judgments and decrees other than those would apparently be barred by N. Y.
Civ. Prac. Act (Cahill, 1937), § 53: "An action, the limitation of which is not specifically prescribed in this article, must be commenced within ten years after the cause
of action accrues.''
21 Mich. Comp. Stat. (1929), § 13976; N. C. Code (1931), § 445. See also,
Strizich v. Zenith Furnace Co., 176 Minn. 554, 223 N. W. 926 (1929), involving
proceedings to enforce compensation payments in arrears, the court construing Minnesota's six year statute.
22 See note 20 for the New York provision. For an opinion dealing with this in
relation to "supplementary proceedings," see Meinhard v. Millstein, 159 Misc. 889,
289 N. Y. S. 206 (1936), reversed 162 Misc. 22, 293 N. Y. S. 966 (1937).
28 Should the view be taken that limitations on civil enforcing actions apply to
civil contempts, it might be quite proper to say that a statutory limitation on contempt
itself referred only to the penal aspect. This seems to recognize the proposition that
civil contempts are essentially only enforcing actions. Odell v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 359.
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ings might be started is the doctrine of laches. 24 It is notable that in
New York, where apparently there is no statute relating to judgments
which will apply to contempts,25 courts have held that the civil proceedings are subject to the bar of laches. 20 Even in states in which
contempts are limited by an action-on-the-judgment statute,21 laches
may be resorted to as a supplementary form of control. 28
It is likely that different results would be reached where the contempt is for breach of a continuing order rather than for the enforcement of a decree requiring immediate payment of money or performance of an act. It is manifest that the statute should not run against a
plaintiff until a violation of the decree has occurred. Some statutory
provisions indicate this by their phrasing, and in this circumstance the
limitations would seem as pertinent as in the case of a decree of a
present act. 29 Even in the case of provisions which in terms limit the
time during which an action may be brought or presume satisfaction
after a period of time from the rendition of the judgment, courts have
held that the period runs from the time the right to proceed accrues
to the plaintiff rather than from the rendition itself, and the statute
thus seems to apply in this situation.so
Limitation provisions of one or the other of the types mentioned
are found in nearly every state. As has been suggested, their applica24 In the absence of any statutory regulation, judgments might also be limited by
a "common-law presumption" of satisfaction. Barber v. International Co. of Mexico,
74 Conn. 652, 51 A. 857 (1902).
25
See note 20, supra.
26
Sax v. Sax, 130 Misc. 696, 224 N. Y. S. 634 (1927). The decree was for
the payment of alimony.
27
Smith v. Smith, 246 Mich. So, 224 N. W. 337 (1929), where the proceedings
were not brought for more than twenty years. The ten-year statute had not run because
the judgment debtor had been out of the jurisdiction all but eight years of the time.
28
Kaiser v. Kaiser, 213 Mich. 660, 181 N. W. 993 (1921), discussed above,
note 13.
29 The provision as to expiration of judgments in New York, for instance, is,
"twenty years from the time when the party recovering it was first entitled to a
mandate to enforce it." Civ. Prac Act, § 44.
so The Michigan court has said that an action-on-the-judgment provision limiting
actions after a specified period of time from the rendition of the judgment does not
preclude contempt proceedings for alimony installments which become payable within
the statutory period immediately preceding the inception of the proceedings. Kaiser
v. Kaiser, 213 Mich. 660, 181 N. W. 993 (1921). See also, Gutowski v. Gutowski,
266 Mich. 1, 253 N. W. 192 (1934); Arrington v. Arrington, 127 N. C. 190, 37
S. E. 212 (1900).
Under Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929), § 886, it has been clearly held in intermediate
courts that the limitation operates only from the date of violation. Kelly v. City of
Cape Girardeau, 230 Mo. App. 137, 89 S. W. (2d) 693 (1936); Mayes v. Mayes,
(Mo. App. 1937) 104 S. W. (2d) 1019. This statute is one of presumed satisfaction
after a specified period of time from the rendition.
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tion to contempt proceedings will be determined in part by the tests
used to distinguish civil from criminal contempt. While heretofore
general limitations on civil proceedings have had little extension into
the field of civil contempt, the tendency to distinguish civil from criminal contempt, together with the marked trend of legislatures to merge
legal and equitable remedies, may well lead courts to apply such
limitations in the future. At the present time there are but few cases
indicating that such will be the result, but the treatment accorded
analogous enforcing actions seems to point in this direction.
Menefee D. Blackwell

